Understanding Users’ Health Information Privacy Concerns for Health Wearables by Becker, Moritz









Health information privacy concerns (HIPC) are 
commonly cited as primary barrier to the ongoing 
growth of health wearables (HW) for private users. 
However, little is known about the driving factors of 
HIPC and the nature of users’ privacy perception. 
Seven semi-structured focus groups with current 
users of HWs were conducted to empirically explore 
factors driving users’ HIPC. Based on an iterative 
thematic analysis approach, where the interview 
codes were systematically matched with literature, I 
develop a thematic map that visualizes the privacy 
perception of HW users. In particular this map 
uncovers three central factors (Dilemma of Forced 
Acceptance, State-Trait Data Sensitivity and 
Transparency) on HIPC, which HW users have to 





Health information privacy concerns (HIPC) 
constitute a barrier to the ongoing growth of health 
information technologies comprising digital 
medicine, electronic medical records or remote 
patient monitoring [1]. Owing to the high sensitivity 
of the gathered personal health information (PHI), 
privacy concerns have proved to be more important 
in the context of such health technologies than other 
technological devices [2]. However, to date, no study 
has offered a comprehensive conceptualization of 
users’ privacy perception and there is no empirical 
evidence of the main factors influencing users’ HIPC. 
The “understanding of information privacy remains 
fragmented in the under examined health context” [3] 
and in particular for wearable health technologies [4]. 
Arising from the intersection of healthcare, health 
informatics, and information systems, health 
wearables (HW) for private users continuously 
monitoring a range of PHI from illness to fitness 
without the need of health professionals (e.g. 
physicians) [5]. Therefore the HW user becomes a 
real-time “walking data generator” [6, p. 63], and 
HIPC occur by exposing such PHI without awareness 
or consent [7]. “In order to address and appease 
individuals’ HIPC, it is imperative to identify and 
understand how different factors influence 
individuals’ HIPC” [3, p. 9]. As privacy concerns are 
complex psychological concepts in the individual 
minds [e.g. 8], I use a thematic analysis approach to 
structure the heterogeneous privacy perceptions into 
homogeneous themes to compare and analyze the 
influencing factors on HIPC of HW users. 
Uncovering the nature of users’ privacy perception 
and identifying the driving factors of HIPC could 
“help researchers and designers understand the major 
dimensions that are critical in their work” [9, p. 497]. 
I ask: What factors influence the HIPC of HW users?  
To answer this research question, I use the HIPC 
Model by Kenny and Connolly [3] to explicitly 
address privacy concerns with health information 
technologies. I conduct seven semi-structured focus 
groups with six users of HWs each and apply a 
rigorous iterative thematic analysis to empirically 
understand users’ mindsets regarding their HIPC. 
This “method for identifying, analyzing, and 
reporting patterns within data” [10, p. 6] has been 
successfully employed to uncover user perception of 
health apps, or compare privacy concerns of digital 
services [11]. By reviewing the conducted codes on 
literature, I enhance the theoretical understanding of 
HIPC by proposing three central factors (Dilemma of 
Forced Acceptance, State-Trait Data Sensitivity and 
Transparency). This thematic map enables 
researchers to uncover the understanding of privacy 
perception of HW users and help practitioners to 
develop privacy-friendly devices.  
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
2.1. Health information privacy concerns  
 
Previous studies primarily use the privacy 
calculus theory to analyze individuals’ willingness to 
share PHI voluntarily if they expect that perceived 
benefits from data disclosure outweigh the perceived 





 costs [e.g. 12, 13]. This tradeoff theory has been 
described as “the most useful framework for 
analyzing contemporary consumer privacy concerns” 
[14, p. 326], but still underscores the risk-control 
interplay. Both risk and control have been shown to 
operate as privacy-borne beliefs relating to the 
potential consequences of PHI disclosure [15]. For 
health technologies, improper information practices 
would result in the mining and mapping of personal 
data to make an individual’s health status more 
visible. The collected PHI may be easily analyzed, 
distributed, and re-used, and users perceive a 
relatively high risk that the provided PHI is being put 
into secondary use for unrelated purposes without 
their knowledge or consent [13]. Thus, the sensitivity 
of various datasets such as demographics, activities 
(e.g. accelerometers, pedometers, location), or 
physiologies (e.g. electrocardiograms, pulse 
oximeters, blood glucose meters, and weight scales) 
in particular, have prompted heated discussions about 
individuals’ health information privacy [4, 16]. 
Health information privacy “is an individual’s right 
to control the acquisition, uses, or disclosures of his 
or her identifiable health data” [17, p. 1]. Kenny and 
Connolly [3] developed the Health Information 
Privacy Concerns Model (HIPC) to explicitly address 
privacy concerns with health information 
technologies. The HIPC is composed of the six 
constructs Collection, Unauthorized Secondary Use, 
Improper Access, Errors, Control and Awareness 
[18]. The first four dimensions are affiliated to the 
Concerns for Information Privacy-Model (CFIP) 
[19]. The two remaining dimensions, Control and 
Awareness, derive from the Internet Users 
Information Privacy Concerns-Model (IUIPC) [20].  
The construct Improper Access is considered 
especially important concerning high sensitive data 
environments [11]. It describes privacy concerns with 
respect to the perceived threat of unauthorized access 
by third parties. Several earlier studies have shown 
that potential access of third parties (e.g. employers 
or insurances) to private health data is a common 
cause of concern for individuals [15].  
Data inaccuracies have been a major issue in 
studies on health technologies [4]. The construct 
Error considers users’ concerns for data inaccuracies. 
Individuals believe the digitization of health data can 
generate more errors [11]. It can be assumed that 
third parties such as insurance companies will only 
contribute to the integration of technologies in a 
healthcare system, if companies provide accurate 
data. Therefore, user insights on measurement 
accuracy are considered crucial [3].  
The dimension Unauthorized Secondary Use 
addresses users’ concerns that their data is utilized 
for other than the agreed upon purposes, such as 
marketing purposes. If individuals believe these 
potential uses may occur, they are likely to express 
HIPC [18].  
Studies show that individuals are concerned 
regarding the electronic collection and storage of 
their PHI [e.g. 1]. The dimension Collection 
describes this subjective concern with respect to the 
accumulation of PHI [3].  
Hong and Thong [18] showed that perceived 
control over the disclosed PHI is an important 
influencing factor for users during their interaction 
with websites. The Control dimension covers the 
individual’s concerns that they do not have adequate 
control over their PHI [20].  
The sixth dimension Awareness refers to the 
individual’s concern regarding their lack of 
awareness of how a device uses and protects the 
privacy of their PHI [20]. Studies assume that users 
are to a large extent unaware of the potential for data 
misuse through the digitalization in health [21]. 
Kenny and Connolly hypothesized that an increased 
awareness leads to higher privacy concerns. 
However, they found support for this hypothesis in 
only one of their two samples [3]. 
 
2.2. Health information privacy concerns of 
health wearables 
 
To empirically explore the influencing factors that 
drive these six dimensions of HIPC I use HWs as one 
of the most distributed health technology for private 
users [4]. I define HWs as small digital devices with 
biometrical sensors designed for private users and 
worn on the body to continuously generate PHI 
without the need for health professionals. By 
continuously collecting PHI and analyzing these data 
in real time HWs provide instantaneous, goal-
oriented feedback. Therefore individuals have the 
chance to understand their health status to reveal 
possibilities for improvement. The collected PHI can 
be stored stationary on the mobile device, the 
computer or digitally in a cloud [13]. 
Owing to the high data sensitivity and the 
mobility of the devices, privacy concerns have 
proved to be more important in the context of HWs 
than other technological devices [e.g. 2, 22]. In 
contrast to medical health wearables for professional 
usage or other clinical devices, in which electronic 
health records are created and managed by healthcare 
providers (hospitals and other clinical organizations), 
HW users create and manage their PHI without the 
help of physicians [23]. While physicians are usually 
required to keep users data confidential, this will be 
subject to further legislator assessment in the case of 
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 HWs. As HW analysis outcomes are immediately 
available in digital form, their dissemination to third 
parties is easy and can be lucrative for suppliers, but 
it can also harm users’ privacy. Many HWs collect 
and store PHI in online portals to connect users to 
their health status and provide goal-oriented feedback 
as needed [4]. Therefore, the technology not only 
improves users’ knowledge about themselves, but 
especially the providers’ knowledge about the users 
[e.g. 8, 9]. Providers even share data with third 
parties, as for example with healthcare providers and 
insurance companies to adjust insurance premiums 
according to the analyzed data sets, which can lead to 




3.1. Thematic analysis of focus groups  
 
I chose a qualitative approach to examine the 
factors that influence the HIPC (Collection, 
Unauthorized Secondary Use, Improper Access, 
Errors, Control and Awareness) of HW users. As 
focus groups are especially well suited to uncovering 
and documenting the ’why’ behind opinions, and in 
obtaining much more depth and breadth of analysis 
from participants than available from individual data 
collection methods [24], I conducted semi-structured 
focus groups with current users of HWs. As focus 
groups allow participants to query each other, explain 
themselves and comment on each other’s experiences 
[25], this research method is frequently used to 
evaluate critical healthcare themes [25] and has been 
already used to uncover privacy aspects [e.g. 11]. The 
interview guide for the group sessions were 
developed on the six dimensions of the HIPC model. 
The interview evaluation is based on the thematic 
analysis approach, as it is a well-established method 
of qualitative data analysis [10]. Thematic analysis is 
a method for identifying, analyzing, and visualizing 
patterns within data and is especially appropriate for 
analysis in sensitive data environments [e.g. 26]. It 
has been successfully employed to uncover user 
perceptions of health apps or critical experiences with 
self-tracking in information systems research [27]. 
By organizing and describing the data set in rich 
detail, it normally goes even further by interpreting 
various aspects of the research topic [26].  
 
3.2. Data collection  
 
Considered to be an adequate number [24], seven 
focus groups were conducted to capture the privacy 
perception of 42 current HW users. To ensure 
participants represented a broad range of experiences 
and ages, I used peer recruitment for all of the seven 
focus groups (opportunistic sampling). The groups 
were designed to encourage participants to interact 
with each other, rather than the researcher, allowing 
“structured eavesdropping” [25, p. 301]. At the start 
of each session the researcher provided an overview 
of the objectives of the study. Afterwards, the 
researcher attempted to restrict their own contribution 
to reading the six questions concerning the six 
dimensions of the HIPC model out aloud, and only 
asking further probing questions when required. Each 
focus group lasted approximately one hour, with 10 
min spent discussing each question. The use of the 
same questions and procedure for each focus group 
facilitated investigation into the similarity of the 
themes discussed across the focus groups [11].  
 
Table 1. Demographic profile of participants 
Demographics  Number of respondents 
Gender Male Female 
20 
22 


























3.3. Data analysis  
 
I follow a rigorous iterative thematic analysis 
approach that matches the interview codes, factors 
and dimensions by constantly reviewing literature. 
Figure 1 provides a detailed illustration of the 
methodological approach, which was not a linear 
phase-to-phase process, but a recursive one, by 
moving back and forth between the different phases 
of the analysis. First, I transcribed the focus groups’ 
audio recordings and then repeatedly read through the 
transcript. Afterwards I generated initial codes by 
searching for recurring patterns in the raw data. In 
this way, I could aggregate the data to workable 
items. I identified 39 different codes in the data set. 
In the next step I merged different codes with factors 
– e.g. users who based their willingness to disclose 
information on the identity of the data recipient or the 
perceived sensitivity of their data. Consequently, the 
two respective codes Recipient-specific Data 
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 Retention and Sensitivity-specific Data Retention 
were matched to the factor Contextualization. The 
process of matching codes with the factors, and then 
the factors with the six dimensions of HIPC was 




The thematic map visualizes the results. It is 
composed of the six dimensions of HIPC Collection, 
Unauthorized Secondary Use, Improper Access, 
Errors, Control, Awareness [3] and their related 16 
factors (Figure 2). 
 
 4.1. Collection 
 
The Collection dimension captures an 
individual’s concerns that a device is collecting and 
storing large quantities of their PHI [3, 19]. Three 
factors were related to this dimension. 
Deanonymization: Users are not aware of the 
degree of anonymization of their PHI. Although users 
wish for an anonymized storage of data, they do not 
eliminate the possibility of personalized storage: “I 
hope my fitness activities are anonymized, it would be 
terrible if my fitness trainer could see them!” [P8] 
Some users were afraid of a Deanonymization 
through the connection of primary and secondary 
data: “There just needs to be a combination of two 
databases and anonymization is worthless.” [P28] 
Location of Data Storage: Users are concerned 
about the location of data storage and analysis: 
“Although I am wearing the device on my body and 
data are shown on the display, I am pretty sure that 
they are saved in a cloud.” [P23] 
Data as Asset: This factor reflects that many users 
perceived PHI disclosure as beneficial. One 
respondent who used his fitness tracker to fight 
obesity perceived his PHI as a means to externally 
verify his healthy lifestyle. He described the reaction 
of his physician when he first showed him his fitness 
trackers, as follows: “When I visited my doctor and 
was asked for my current blood pressure, I could 
show the measured value on my health wearable. The 
doctor really appreciated that.” [P7] A lot of users 
valued the collection of PHI to monitor their fitness 
activities.  
 
4.2. Unauthorized secondary use 
 
The Unauthorized Secondary Use dimension 
relates to an individual’s fear that their PHI is 
collected for one purpose but used for additional 
purposes without obtaining their permission [3, 19]. 
Cross-connection: The first factor concerning 
Unauthorized Secondary Use describes the 
unconscious worries over the connection of data with 
other databases. The users have little or no 
knowledge regarding whether this connection 
happens in reality: “I do not know whether apps and 
devices are communicating and exchanging data.” 
[P3] Some users assume that, by using the device, 
there is an automatic authorization for the business 
partner to use, analyze and pass on the data: “Of 
course, they will save all of my available data and 
create a profile to optimize the evaluation.” [P17] 
Additionally, users think cross-connection carries a 
high possibility for errors: “My device is not able to 
count my steps appropriately, how should it be 
possible to connect and analyze different data 
sources and create predictions?” [P36] 
Figure 1. Iterative thematic analysis approach  
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 Trust Cues: The study participants are aware of 
the possibility that data could be sold to third parties. 
During the conversations, the usage of the word 
“hopefully” is striking when talking about the 
anonymization of data. This shows the concerns 
about personalized data transfer. Furthermore, the 
nescience about laws and rights concerning the usage 
and transfer of data causes further concerns, 
especially regarding the degree of anonymization: 
“They got the data and if it is legal, they will use 
them. But hopefully, the data are anonymized.” [P12]  
Contextualization: This factor refers to the 
observation that users compared their disclosure of 
PHI to their disclosure behavior in other contexts and 
decided to reveal personal information based on the 
perceived comparative sensitivity of the PHI. So, one 
user states that she foregoes privacy consciously, 
because otherwise she could not use a new feature. 
Other participants with similar views state that there 
is a trade-off between costs and benefits depending 
on the context. P30 states: “Sometimes I do not think 
about my privacy, it is more important to me to use 
the device quickly and that everything is running.” 
Almost all focus groups were open-minded towards a 
transfer of anonymized data for medical research 
purposes. Users were reluctant to make their PHI 
accessible to third parties, but were open-minded to 
its use by employees to improve the tracker: “I do 
not care about usage of data by software developers 
who want to improve the trackers. I would even 
support it!” [P15] Other users were indifferent 
towards disclosing their PHI to friends, but reluctant 
to make it accessible to providers: “I like to share my 
eating habits with friends but I am concerned about 
sharing it with my insurance company.” [P1] 
4.3. Improper access 
 
The Improper Access dimension covers 
individuals’ concerns that devices do not have 
adequate measures in place to prevent unauthorized 
individuals or organizations from accessing their PHI 
[3, 19]. Users of HW are aware of security gaps but 
differentiate depending on access route between a 
passive improper access (Provider Complacency) and 
an active improper access (Hacking Hazard). 
Provider Complacency: Describes the 
unauthorized access by third parties which happens 
incidentally or passively because of insufficient 
privacy adjustment options. “For instance, Fitbit’s 
default privacy settings inadvertently exposed 
information about some of their users’ sexual 
activities.“ [P21] Users are especially concerned 
about the privacy complacency of companies 
financed by venture capitals, as the goal of fast 
economical success is often more important than the 
implementation of privacy features or the 
identification and closing of security gaps. So, neither 
“the brand nor the reputation” [P35] can be affected 
and “companies try to be the first one in the market, 
so privacy will not be placed first.” [P33] P36 adds: 
“Providers cannot make any money with privacy – 
that is theme is just expensive for these firms.” 
Hacking Hazard: This factor summarizes the 
observation that users are afraid of being hacked if 
they are part of a bigger data collection. The more 
data a company collects, the higher the objection and 
“then it is just a matter of time until you get 
attacked.” [P25] However, users had no concrete 
idea of the extent and the consequences of this active 
improper access.  
Figure 2. Thematic map of privacy perceptions of health wearable users 
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 4.4. Errors 
 
The Errors dimension relates to the individual’s 
concerns that devices do not have adequate measures 
in place to prevent or correct errors in their PHI [3, 
19]. 
Data Inaccuracy: This factor describes the extent 
to which users experienced inaccurate data 
measurements or functional disorders of HWs. When 
it comes to the accuracy of the produced data, users 
state that the recorded data are mostly just “semi-
precise” [P2] or “also inaccurate” [P7] and a 
general “deviation of up to 15% is acceptable.” 
[P16] Based on their own experiences, some users 
described aspects, which influence data accuracy 
negatively. In general, users are not concerned about 
privacy aspects, if there is less data inaccuracy.  
Anticipated Consequence: The users separate the 
consequences of incurrence data between two usage 
scenarios of HWs. In the first usage scenario (private 
focus), users accept approximate values for the rough 
estimation of the performance as long as the 
generated data serve no medical purpose or will be 
passed on to health insurances. P5 states: “Whether 
the indicated 8,567 steps on my tracker were 
recorded correctly, does not matter for me as long as 
my health insurance or other institution do not get 
the PHI.” In the second usage scenario (professional 
health focus) users are afraid that approximate values 
of the generated PHI could lead to erroneous 
allocations within tariff systems, or could be used for 
medical diagnoses or treatments. So, some focus 
groups discussed the opportunity to falsify the data 
actively and consciously. “I think the topic is very 
sensitive, because we do not know who controls it." 
[P3] P1 comments on that: “I buckle the device to my 
dog and get it to chase a ball in the garden.” 
Error Type: Four of the seven focus groups 
discussed different error types and their effects. Type 
one errors represent the occasions when flawed data 
leads to misleading feedback, which incorrectly 
diagnoses lack of activity or other issues, or even 
diseases. Users relying on this information, instead of 
a professional medical evaluation, can misdiagnose 
themselves, resulting in dangerous self-treatment. 
Type two errors relate to the possibility that devices 
can miss symptoms which indicate the presence of an 
issue or disease, resulting in the owner being 
described incorrectly as healthy and active. P29 
summarizes: “Without a doctor’s advice, users do 
not choose an appropriate level of activity to get well 
again, resulting in harm through overextending 
themselves with too much physical activity. And this 




The Control dimension covers an individual’s 
concerns that they do not have adequate control over 
their PHI [3, 20].  
Transparency: On the one hand, users were aware 
of the collection and storage of their PHI for 
individualized evaluations (e.g. progressing 
statistics). On the other hand, a lot of users possessed 
neither an overview of the extent of data collection, 
nor the control between primary and secondary data 
analysis. “I am aware of the storage of my data as 
they are needed for personal feedback but I have no 
idea about the further use of my health data.” [P23] 
In particular, users have little or no insight into which 
data are analyzed, in which way, and how to control 
this: “I can control when to wear or not to wear the 
device, but there is no transparency of data control.” 
[P21] P22 adds that: “I think there is always a 
disparity between the amount of data recorded and 
the data shown to the user.”  
Dilemma of Forced Acceptance: P6 describes the 
dilemma of the HW users: “I am either forced to use 
the device and know about the data recording and the 
possible usage of the data or I decide against the 
usage consciously.” From the users’ perspective, a 
comprehensive control of the PHI recorded by the 
HW is no longer possible. They see the conscious 
renunciation of such devices as the only way out. 
Thereby, the consequences of a conscious 
renunciation of HWs are seen as “a step back to a 
bygone age,” [P2] where the “numerous advantages 
of the technological development did not exist.” 
[P27] Many users highly doubt whether such a 
release is possible at all: “I would like to have more 
control about my data, but you have to accept how it 
goes. Beggars cannot be choosers.” [P7] All focus 
groups discussed this compulsive acceptance of 
HWs. Post-purchase lock-in effects were of particular 
concern: “Once I have bought the product and then, 
for example, terms and conditions change 
afterwards, I would probably accept all privacy 
restrictions and continue to use the product because 
of the money invested and the activity records that 




The Awareness dimension refers to the 
individual’s concern regarding their lack of 
awareness of how a device uses and protects the 
privacy of their PHI [3, 20]. 
State-Trait Data Sensitivity: The participants 
perceive the data generated by the HW as sensitive 
and private. “These are data from my internal body, 
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 it couldn’t be any more sensitive!” [P12]. 
Nevertheless, users perceive data sensitivity 
differently, with a differentiation between personal 
and device data sensitivity: The device data 
sensitivity summarizes the observation that users 
differentiate depending on the device focus. Devices 
with a health and medical focus are associated with 
higher data sensitivity and devices with a fitness and 
lifestyle focus are related to lower data sensitivity. 
Independent of the device, the users described 
different personal data sensitivities. Some users 
described the data tracked by a device as “extreme” 
[P6], “high” [P12] or “ultimate” [P16] sensitive, 
whereas other users perceived them as “not as 
sensitive as bank- or identity documents.” [P22] P29 
summarizes: “I think most of the users are aware of 
the data sensitivity. But as with many things in life, 
for one user they are more sensitive than for the 
other.”  
Trivialization: Within the user groups, the 
participants often make statements like: “It is not that 
bad, the government will monitor this and will 
intervene if necessary.” [P22] “I have nothing to 
hide, they can access my data.” [P2] More than the 
half of the users expressed such statements. These 
verbalized trivializations show a helplessness of the 
users. “I think we trivialize the whole situation 
because we are able to change something, if we want 
to use the devices entirely.” [P34]  
Fear of the Future: This factor summarizes the 
observation that many users are worried about the 
future: Some users ask themselves where the 
technical developments are leading to, and where the 
limits will be set with regard to privacy. “The next 
generations know only complete digitalization, so the 
sensitivity will decrease and the indifference will 
increase. I am honestly worried about where this is 
leading to.” [P33]  
 
5. Discussion  
 
This study was motivated by the research call to 
“identify and understand how different factors 
influence individuals’ HIPC” [3]. To understand the 
factors that drive HIPC I used HWs as one of the 
most distributed health technology for private users 
[4]. Seven semi-structured focus groups with a 
rigorous iterative thematic analysis were evaluated to 
empirically understand the HIPC of HW users. Based 
on this iterative approach that constantly matches the 
interview codes, factors and dimensions on literature, 
I used a thematic map to visualize, share and discuss 
the findings deriving from the qualitative data 
analysis. This thematic map visualizes the structure 
that best represents users’ perceptions of HIPC 
distinguishing on the six dimensions of HIPC 
(Collection, Unauthorized Secondary Use, Improper 
Access, Errors, Control and Awareness) and their 16 
factors. While the different focus groups and their 
participants have proposed a large number and 
variety of different points of interest, three factors 
(Dilemma of Forced Acceptance, State-Trait Data 
Sensitivity and Transparency) stood out in terms of 
frequency of mentioning as well as discussion length 
and intensity. These three factors were discussed in 
all focus groups and were mentioned by more than 90 
percent of the users. 
Dilemma of Forced Acceptance: Despite the fact 
that many users perceived the PHI collection of their 
devices as a threat to their privacy, some users also 
voiced sympathy for PHI disclosure. This contrasts 
the mainstream privacy research on wearable health 
technologies, where privacy is often exclusively 
treated as a user-side threat [2]. In my study, PHI 
disclosure was valued as an ability to monitor 
personal activities or as a source of potential 
monetary compensation by insurance companies. 
Although this implies people consider the risks and 
benefits of providing PHI to some degree, the factor 
Data as Asset relating to the benefits offered by 
HWs, indicates users are principally focused on the 
benefits they believe they will receive for disclosing 
PHI. So almost all users report a Dilemma of Forced 
Acceptance of HWs where HIPC are mainly caused 
by lack of control, but the advantages of HWs are so 
predominant, that a conscious renunciation is not 
possible. Many users have already given up trying to 
do something about high HIPC and now accept the 
situation, as they do not see any possibility for action 
with regard to this dilemma. These users “seem to be 
likely to accept constant monitoring [of PHI] through 
sensors because they are persuaded that the benefits 
outweigh the costs” [28, p. 11]. Consequently, the 
majority of the participants could be described as 
users of HWs that see themselves, as “beggars that 
cannot be choosers.” These users process the 
Dilemma of Forced Acceptance with the two factors 
of Awareness (Trivialization and Fear of the Future). 
On the one hand users handle the situation by 
understating their HIPC and hope for legal support 
(Trivialization). On the other hand users deal with 
this dilemma by pushing it further into the future and 
formulate dark future prospects, so they do not have 
to deal with it now (Fear of the Future). State-Trait 
Data Sensitivity: The factor State-Trait Data 
Sensitivity confirms other research studies [e.g. 3, 
15] which show that the more sensitive individuals 
perceive PHI to be, the greater their concerns are 
regarding the privacy of this data. My qualitative 
results are in accordance with Li, Wu, Gao and Shi 
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 [13, p. 15], who noted that “health information 
sensitivity (has) significant effects on individuals’ 
perceived privacy risk.” But my results indicate this 
factor should be divided into two components of 
State-Trait Data Sensitivity. First, a personal 
component (personal data sensitivity) referring to the 
observation, that data sensitivity varies from one 
individual to another. In this sense personal data 
sensitivity could be seen as a trait factor [15], where 
an individual that has higher personal data sensitivity 
will likely be more concerned over its use, storage, 
and privacy, than a person with a lower personal data 
sensitivity. The second component (device data 
sensitivity) refers to the observation that users 
perceive that fitness and lifestyle-focused devices 
collected less sensitive PHI than health- and medical-
focused devices. This result confirms previous 
studies in which researchers reported that individuals 
found health or medical data much more sensitive 
than other information such as demographic, lifestyle 
habits, or purchasing behaviors [1]. Kenny and 
Connolly [3] called this “from illness to fitness”, 
while Alrige and Chatterjee [9] differentiated 
between monitoring (medical), prevention (fitness), 
and communication (lifestyle) situation and devices. 
This State-Trait Data Sensitivity is also reflected in 
the factors Anticipated Consequences and 
Contextualization. First, the users separate the 
consequences of inaccurate data between two usage 
scenarios of HWs. Therefore, users accept 
approximate values for the rough estimation of the 
performance as long as the generated PHI serve no 
medical purpose. If the device has a professional 
health focus the users are afraid that approximate 
values of the generated PHI could lead to incorrect 
allocations within tariff systems or could be used for 
inaccurate medical diagnoses or treatments. Second, 
HIPC for HW users were context-related 
(Contextualization). Users of HW compared their 
attitude towards the disclosure of PHI to their 
disclosure behavior in other contexts [12]. Many 
users decided to reveal personal information based on 
the comparative sensitivity of the health-related 
information. That means they would not shudder to 
publish PHI for when they perceived the disclosed 
PHI as equally or less sensitive to the personal 
information they provided to other companies in 
other contexts. Furthermore, users of HW were far 
more positive towards PHI disclosure for the purpose 
of medical research purposes or product 
improvement, than for transferring PHI to third 
parties.  
Transparency: Initiated by the technical 
possibilities through Cross-connection, 
Deanonymization and Location of Data Storage, 
almost every participant reported a perceived loss of 
transparency when using HWs. This factor, was also 
stated to be a strong trigger for HIPC in other studies 
of health technologies [e.g. 11, 29]. Not only does 
this lend credence to the idea that people principally 
seek informational self-determination when engaging 
with technology services, but also echoes one of the 
factors—control over collection and usage PHI—in 
the IUIPC scale [20]. Validating the CFIP scale, 
Stewart and Segars stated that, “a central concern that 
seems to underlie consumer attitudes, and is perhaps 
the common theme captured by the higher-order 
concept of CFIP, is the issue of control. Consumers 
desire levels of personalization and customization but 
also want some sense of control over how this service 
occurs” [30, p. 46]. This control-based privacy 
dilemma is already discussed in privacy literature 
[e.g. 11], and confirmed in other empirical studies 
[e.g. 20]. Although Control was identified as an 
important dimension of HIPC [3], for HW users the 
PHI control is more than the disclosure or non-
disclosure of information. It is a decision making 
process in which the HW user considers the HW 
usage scenario (private focus vs. professional health 
focus), of engaging in a particular behavior. As new 
technologies affect this calculus of behavior [11], 
individuals are often unable to predict the nature of 
that which has to be managed. This understanding of 
a behavior calculus underpins Culnan and Bies’ 
observation that a “social exchange perspective also 
applies to a consumer context” [14, p. 327] or, in my 
sense, a consumer health context.  
 
 
6. Implications and Conclusion 
 
6.1. Implications  
 
This study has important theoretical and practical 
implications. The thematic map provides researchers 
with a visualized structure of what determines a 
user’s HIPC and can be seen as a strong initial insight 
into the main drivers of HIPC. It is acknowledged 
that other factors may be influential, but it is 
maintained that this thematic map represents a strong 
starting point. Therefore, results from this study can 
contribute to the understanding of HIPC and identify 
possible avenues for future research. For instance 
further research could prove the relationship between 
the developed factors and the dimensions of the 
thematic map in a quantitative study. 
Moreover, the findings of this study could support 
theory-building efforts to uncover the meaningful 
interplay between HIPC and perceived benefits in the 
user’s mind. This multifaceted picture of a user’s 
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 mental trade-off decision, in particular concerning the 
Dilemma of Forced Acceptance and the 
Transparency opens new research directions. 
Therefore, the developed factors will further enhance 
the understanding of the role information privacy 
plays in health context and will strengthen the 
literature by extending constructs concerning HIPC 
and PHI disclosure [13].  
The thematic map can serve as a practical 
guideline for providers to develop privacy-friendly 
devices. The study results can serve as an important 
building block in privacy requirements engineering 
for healthcare information technologies [21] and 
corresponding privacy-enhancing technologies [7]. 
This is especially relevant as the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GPDR) coming applicable in 
2018. Providers must strategize privacy alignment for 
their products by incorporating in their design the 
privacy and data protection capabilities necessary for 
regulatory compliance and gaining user trust.  
First, users did not want their PHI to be used for 
purposes other than the ones agreed upon between 
them and the provider. The provider could decrease 
HIPC, by increasing their transparency about data 
storing and dissemination. Individuals made their 
data retention dependent on both the usage scenario 
and the severity of PHI [12].  
Second, the results show that the Control is an 
important dimension in user mindsets concerning 
HIPC. Furthermore, some of study participants 
wanted providers to protect their PHI irrespective of 
costs. This signals that providers need to gain 
trustworthiness by addressing those privacy concerns 
through a transparent information policy [16]. 
Consequently, to increase customer satisfaction and 
market reach, providers need to reveal the identity of 
third parties accessing the data, the purpose of the 
data usage and the objectives for which the data is 
used. So a company, which focuses on the perceived 
lack of control and gives the user a feeling of control 
over the data, could reach a unique selling point over 
the competitors. This unique selling point could then 
be a reason to buy the device from this specific 
company.  
Third, despite these insights into decreasing the 
HIPC by increasing the control of PHI, providers 
could utilize the users Dilemmas of Forced 
Acceptance. As most of the users see themselves as 
“beggars are not choosers”, and want to use the 
devices independently of their HIPC, companies 
should minimize the barriers to entry for the first 
usage of the device and clearly communicate the 
benefits. So companies could win new users, e.g. 
through low prices and free extra features 
independently of HIPC with the intent that “once a 
user, always a user”. 
 
6.2. Limitations and further research  
 
An obvious limitation of this study was the small 
sample size of 42 people who took part in the focus 
groups. However, as this was an exploratory study 
involving focus groups, and the “[…] common rule 
of thumb is that most projects consist of four to seven 
focus groups” [24, p. 144], an average of six 
participants in each focus group is reasonable.  
A major advantage of focus groups—their ability 
to encourage group level discussion—is potentially 
one of their major limitations. Participants may 
behave differently if faced with the device assigned 
to their focus group in a different context (e.g. using 
it alone to achieve a specific goal). To avoid this, 
peoples’ stated privacy behavior is sometimes not the 
same as their actual behavior.  
In focus groups, people may be more truthful 
about their privacy behavior in front of others who 
may challenge them and ask for justification of their 
views. In focus group discussions, people may be 
reminded by other participants of factors they would 
not normally consider, and therefore there is a danger 
of dominant personalities steering a group’s 
discussion. Both biases were mitigated to some 
extent by the study’s design. Firstly, the use of a 
standard set of six questions, with an approximately 
similar amount of time allotted to each question, 
ensured discussion remained focused. Secondly, the 
researcher ensured that the discussion was not 
hijacked by particular participants. 
The definition of HWs excludes medical devices, 
in which health professionals diagnose and evaluate 
users’ medical problems. Therefore, it would be 
interesting to compare the study results and 
especially the developed thematic map with patients 
suffering chronic diseases or in general with users of 
professional medical devices and analyze whether 
additional dimensions or factors of HIPC emerge. 
The focus groups consist of actual users of HWs, 
not potential ones. For these the benefits of HWs 
obviously outweighed the perceived privacy concerns 
otherwise they would not have decided in favor of 
their devices [e.g. 12, 13]. On the other hand, 
potential users might be deterred from using HWs 
due to perceived concerns. That is why another study 
should deal with HIPC and the influencing factors for 
potential users. Moreover, it would be interesting to 
analyze the effects of the GPDR implementation. 
Further research could evaluate, if stricter regulations 
influence individuals’ privacy perception and 
whether new thematic maps with other factors occur.  
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